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This study investigates the impact of ownership structure on the extent of voluntary 
disclosure by Malaysian listed firms over the volatile time period 1996 to 2006. During 
this period of time, the onset of the 1997 Asian financial crisis and global corporate 
scandals resulted in major institutional and environmental changes. The nature of these 
regulatory reforms clearly impacted on firm management’s incentives to voluntarily 
disclose more information in annual reports.  
 
The results show that the average level of voluntary disclosure is generally low although 
there is an increase in the extent of voluntary disclosure exhibited by Malaysian firms 
over the eleven-year time period. Controlling for firm size, leverage and profitability, the 
empirical results show that ownership concentration is positively associated with 
voluntary disclosure. The positive association of high ownership concentration may 
reflect the firms’ choice to disclose more information as a governance initiative to 
enhance transparency. Institutional and foreign ownership have motivation to disclose in 
excess of mandatory requirements. The findings imply that the presence of institutional 
and foreign investors in a firm pushes firms to voluntarily disclose more information in 
annual reports. Such enhanced disclosure practice should be encouraged in order to 
attract funds from such investors both locally and abroad. 
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Introduction 
There have been major institutional changes taken place, particularly in strengthening 
corporate governance, transparency and accountability over the last decade. These 
changes were largely due to the onset of the 1997 Asian financial crisis and the later 
global pressures such as the corporate collapses of Enron and Worldcom. The purpose of 
this study is to shed light on the ownership structure amidst the development of corporate 
governance during the pre- and post financial crisis. Specifically, this paper attempts to 
empirically investigate the hypothesized influence of ownership structure and ownership 
types on the extent of voluntary disclosure in annual reports of firms.  
 
The 1997 financial crisis prompted Malaysian regulatory bodies to initiate reforms in this 
emerging economy characterized by weak market for corporate control. With the setting 
up of the high level of Finance Committee on Corporate Governance in 1998, various 
efforts have been implemented to improve corporate governance in Malaysia. The nature 
of these regulatory reforms is aimed at enhancing corporate transparency, which clearly 
impacts on firm management’s incentives to disclose information voluntarily. Not long 
after the crisis, the global accounting scandals emanating from high profile corporate 
collapse occurred. As a response to it, the USA Sarbanes-Oxley Act was passed in 2002, 
which not only had a positive impact on the voluntary disclosure of information security 
activities by firms [19], it has fundamentally changed the global corporate governance 
landscape towards greater transparency. Pertinent to this, Malaysian governing bodies 
have in parallel been actively improving their regulatory framework, in particular, 
corporate disclosure, governance and transparency.  
 
Corporate governance structure may shape the firm’s ownership and control. Corporate 
ownership in Malaysia is typically characterized by concentrated shareholdings; with 
different owners distinctively display traits of behavior and preference for corporate 
governance practices. The unique institutional policies like the New Economic Policy 
(NEP) and the Industrial Coordination Act 1975 have caused the shift of ownership and 
control to the companies that have close link with the government sector [18]. Part 4 of 
the Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance recognizes the importance of institutional 
investors in ensuring good corporate governance practices in Malaysia. This category of 
investors is seen as an important group of agents in the market for corporate equity 
because of their ability to exert direct influence on management activities [1]. Once a 
British-colonized country, foreign investors continue to remain dominant in the corporate 
ownership structure of some listed companies. For decades, Malaysia is dependent on 
foreign direct investment to spur economic growth [6]. Following the large outflow of 
foreign capital funds during the financial crisis period, several initiatives were undertaken 
to maintain or attract FDI to Malaysia, which include improving corporate governance, 
introduction of rules to allow foreign investors 100% ownership in manufacturing sector.   
 
According to [5], the concentrated ownership structure has affected the effectiveness of 
important mechanisms of shareholder protection such as transparency and disclosure. 
Voluntary disclosure is of significant concern in a developing country with emerging 
markets, like Malaysia where the development and sustainability of capital market relies 
heavily on reducing the information gap between management and investors. According 
to [40], Malaysian capital market has increased its importance and is keenly competing to 
be among the leading stock market locations in this region. The study of voluntary 
disclosure practices within the Malaysian setting is important and timely. Also, 
examining the association between ownership structure and voluntary disclosure practice 
in Malaysia, with its unique institutional policies, could provide valuable input to the 
international debate concerning the impact of Western accounting and governance rules 
upon developing countries reporting regimes.  
 
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section, the theoretical framework, relevant 
prior literature and hypothesis development are advanced. Section 3 describes the data 
and methodology while section 4 presents the findings of the study. Section 5 concludes 
the study with final comments, limitations of the study and suggestions for future 
research.  
 
Literature review and hypotheses development 
Ownership structure is an integral part of corporate governance because of the inevitable 
agency conflict between shareholders and managers. [28] positive agency theory 
postulates that when there is a separation of ownership and control of a firm, the potential 
for agency costs arises due to the conflict of interest arising from divergent goals between 
the contracting parties. The conflicting incentives between managers and shareholders 
caused by interest incongruence and information asymmetry give rise to the information 
or “lemons” problems which may subsequently lead to the breakdown in the functioning 
of the capital market [3] [24]. As a result, there is a need for control mechanism to align 
the interests of managers and shareholders in order to resolve the agency problem. Given 
the comparative advantage of information possession, it is possible that managers may 
provide information on voluntary basis to reduce any undesirable costs. 
 
Within the corporate governance context, ownership concentration and composition are 
two key aspects of ownership structure that determine the level of monitoring [5]. When 
ownership is widely held, [17] argue that the potential for conflicts between principal 
(shareholder) and agent (manager) is greater than in more closely held firms. Agency 
theory argues that firms will disclose more information to reduce agency costs and 
information asymmetry in a diffused ownership environment [12]. As a result, 
discretionary disclosure in annual reports is likely to be greater in widely held firms so 
that individual shareholders can effectively monitor that their economic interests are 
optimized and managers can signal that they act in the best interests of the shareholders.  
Prior empirical research document that disclosure is greater in firms with diffused 
ownership. [23] report a significant positive relationship between voluntary disclosure of 
Malaysian firms and ownership diffusion based on the proportion of shares held by top 
ten shareholders. [12] reveal that the level of information disclosure is positively 
associated with wider ownership in Hong Kong firms. The results of these studies of 
voluntary disclosure behavior provide support for the agency theory that there is a 
positive association between wider ownership and the extent of voluntary disclosure. 
 
Contrary to the above, [41] argue that the individual shareholder, due to low ownership 
stake, in the diffused ownership firm may lack monitoring capacity and formidable force 
to influence firm’s disclosure decision. Thus, managers in a more widespread ownership 
structure lack bargaining power to press for more information thus, may resort to 
voluntarily disclosing little information in the annual reports. Empirically, [15] [4] find 
no significant association between the level of disclosure and ownership diffusion. [33] 
and [32] also find weak support for the hypothesis that increased ownership diffusion 
increases the disclosure of segment information. These empirical studies do not 
consistently support the proposition explained in terms of agency theory.  
 
By contrast, when a concentrated ownership exists, the majority of ownership is 
controlled by a small number of large, dominant shareholders who could play an 
important role in monitoring management. There is a reduced agency problem in the 
highly concentrated firms because of the greater incentive alignment between owners and 
managers [28]. Large shareholders have the incentives and resources to monitor 
management decisions and reduce agency costs [36]. However, large shareholders may 
use access to insider’s information to their own advantage, exploit access expenditure 
according to their own preference, and influence managers’ decision [29].  
 
No consistent empirical results on the association between voluntary disclosure and 
ownership concentration have been achieved. While [7] and [27] findings of negative 
association between voluntary disclosure and ownership concentration are in alignment 
with theoretical argument, [19] reveal that ownership concentration is not statistically 
significant in explaining the variability of voluntary disclosure of Malaysian listed firms.  
 
The rapid growth of Malaysian economy coupled with the unprecedented development of 
institutional and regulatory landscape has not diluted the concentrated ownership 
structure in Malaysia. Corporate ownership in Malaysia is typically characterized by 
concentrated shareholding. [31] finds the ownership of shareholding among the 100 
largest Malaysian firms in the 1960s to be highly concentrated. Lately, a study by [40] 
shows that the five largest shareholders in a sample of companies comprising over 50 
percent of Bursa Malaysia’s market capitalization owned 60.4 percent of the outstanding 
shares and more than half of the voting shares. [2] reports a similar high concentration of 
ownership where the top five largest shareholders held about 58.8% of total equity in the 
corporate sector. He further reports that about half of the public listed companies had five 
shareholders owning about 60.4% of the outstanding shares. In view of firms that are 
predominantly concentrated and with a controlling majority [37], the hypothesis is 
developed to test cross-sectionally over three separate time periods, as follows:  
 
H1: Ceteris paribus, there is a negative association between ownership 
concentration and the extent of voluntary disclosure of information. 
 
The composition of the ownership determines the governance problem and the extent of 
disclosure. Studies have shown that disclosure orientation of firms is greatly influenced 
by the identity of ownership [18], [30], [38]. In a recent study, [9] empirically examine 
the role of ownership in explaining voluntary segment disclosures in Australian firms 
from 2001 to 2003. They find that firms having high level of shares owned by top 20 
shareholders were more likely to disclose voluntary segment information. The finding 
indicates that ownership concentration in the hands of large shareholders has an ability to 
mitigate the agency problems inherent in a firm by influencing the voluntary disclosures 
made by the firm. 
 
Unlike firms in developed countries, the ownership composition in Malaysian listed firms 
is owned predominantly by insider shareholders. [13] disclose that the founder family and 
descendants are held to be in strong control of the firms in Malaysia. Similarly, [40] 
reports that family ownership was prevalent among Malaysian companies where some 
67.2 percent of shares were in family hands. [11] report that 42% of Malaysian listed 
firms has a high family ownership concentration. Such high family ownership has led to 
governance structures that enable the dominant shareholding family to make key 
decisions on their own like deciding information disclosure in annual reports. As a result, 
the agency problem in family owned firms stems from the conflict of interest between 
owners/managers and minority shareholders [37].  
 
In the context of voluntary disclosure, arguably, the problem of information asymmetry 
and opportunistic behaviour should be lessened due to the fact that ownership and control 
still remain one and the same in family controlled firms. Controlling shareholders in such 
firms have greater access to internal information of the firm, and may not have to rely, to 
a greater extent, on public disclosure to manage their investment. Thus, it leads to low 
agency costs and reduced information asymmetry. In the same way, they limit their 
information disclosure to the public in order to prevent leakage of proprietary information 
to competitors as well as avoid unwanted political and social scrutiny, but at the expense 
of minority shareholders. This unique family ownership generates low demand for 
adequate disclosure but poses a threat to transparency on corporate governance practices. 
 
The empirical evidence on the association between family ownership and the extent of 
voluntary disclosure concurs with theoretical argument. [12] report that the level of 
information disclosure is less in family-controlled firms. Similarly, in other studies where 
the number of family members on the board of directors is used as a surrogate for family 
control show a negative relation to the extent of voluntary disclosure [25], [23], [19]. All 
these findings show that they have little motivation to disclose information in excess of 
mandatory requirements because the demand for public disclosure is relatively low in 
comparison with companies that have wider ownership. Accordingly, the hypothesis 
developed as below:   
 
H2: Ceteris paribus, there is a negative association between family 
ownership and the extent of voluntary disclosure of information. 
 
Besides family ownership, foreign and institutional ownerships exert greater influences 
on Malaysian corporate governance. Foreign equity ownership continues to play a crucial 
role in stimulating the economic growth of the company and the country. Foreign 
investors enhance corporate governance practices, which impacts significantly on firm’s 
disclosure practices. [23] and [7] found a significant positive relationship between 
voluntary disclosure and foreign ownership. This is in line with expectations and supports 
the argument that obtaining funds means a greater need for disclosure to monitor actions 
by management. However, the results contradicts findings by [39]. This is reasonably 
expected due to changes in disclosure practices over time.  
 
Apparently, foreign owners’ presence in the company will influence corporate 
governance practices, which impacts significantly on firm’s disclosure decision. The 
Malaysian government’s restriction on foreign ownership dictates that foreign investors 
could hold up to 30 percent of a company’s shareholding. While the 30 percent foreign 
ownership cap still maintains, there has been an increase in foreigners’ stake in some 
business sectors following the liberalization rule to allow for greater foreign investment 
under the Securities Commission’s Capital Market Master Plan. Many of the 
multinational companies incorporated in Malaysia eg. Shell Malaysia and Nestle (M) Bhd 
are subsidiaries of big conglomerates in foreign countries and the presence of foreigners 
on board will influence the quality of information disclosure in order to meet foreign 
reporting requirements. Hence, foreign ownership can be a determinant in explaining the 
variability in information disclosure in the annual reports. Thus, 
 
H3: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive association between foreign 
ownership and the extent of voluntary disclosure of information. 
 
In the changing environment, strategic decision makers in companies have witnessed the 
emergence of a new stakeholder group, institutional investors. Because investments made 
by institutional investors are large, they have a strong interest not only in the financial 
performance of the firms in which they invest, but also in the strategies, activities and 
other stakeholders of the firms. In Malaysia, the introduction of the NEP has caused the 
shift of ownerships and control from foreigners to the government. Essentially, the NEP 
is an economic program of affirmative action where the politically dominant Malays are 
enabled to enjoy a 30 percent stake in the country’s corporate wealth by 1990 [26]. 
Following this, the government implemented several programs to acquire corporate 
wealth for the benefit of bumiputra (comprises largely Malay group and a minority of 
other indigenous ethnic groups) through the creation of trust agencies, new statutory 
bodies, and government-linked corporations. Examples of domestic institutional investors 
in the Malaysian capital market consist largely of government-linked investment 
companies like Khazanah Nasional Berhad, insurance companies, mutual funds, pension 
funds, financial institutions and investment trust.  
  
Substantial shareholding by institutional investors have strong incentives to monitor 
corporate disclosure practices to reduce informational asymmetry [14], [15]. Similarly, 
[10] found that there is a significant positive relationship between institutional 
shareholdings and corporate disclosure practices. However, based on a study of interim 
disclosure by Finnish firms, [35] reported an inverse relationship between institutional 
ownership concentration and disclosure. On the other hand, [32] and [33] both find weak 
support for the hypothesis that increased institutional ownership associated with 
voluntary disclosure practices. Hence, 
 
H4: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive association between institutional 
ownership and the extent of voluntary disclosure of information. 
 
Research Design 
The annual report sample 
The analysis covers three key time periods that are considered critical in terms of 
regulatory reforms following the environmental change. These time periods include 1996 
representing pre-1997 Asian financial crisis, 2001 representing post-financial crisis, and 
2006 post Enron debacle. The annual reports of 50 Malaysian listed firms for each time 
period are randomly selected from the population of firms listed on the Bursa Malaysia 
(formerly known as Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange). The criteria of sample firm 
selection are: (i) availability of annual reports of firms for all the three periods; (ii) firms 
selected in 1996 must remain listed on the stock exchange in the other two periods; and 
(iii) all banks, unit trust, insurance and finance companies are excluded from the study 
due to different and stringent regulatory requirements. 
 
Dependent Variable – development and scoring of disclosure checklist 
The extent of voluntary disclosure is measured using the self-constructed voluntary 
disclosure index (VDI) comprising 85 voluntary disclosure items. This comprehensive 
voluntary disclosure instrument is developed based on their deemed importance in the 
prior disclosure studies conducted in developing countries [19], [7], [23], [27], and is 
used for capturing and measuring differences in disclosure practices among firms. The 
complete content of each annual report is scrutinized against the disclosure checklist 
which is then sub-classified into strategic and corporate information, financial and capital 
market information, directors and senior management information, future prospects, and 
social and value-added information.  
 
Adopting [22] approach, this study applies the unweighted scoring approach where an 
item scores 1 if disclosed and 0 if it is not, subject to the applicability of the item 
concerned. The weighted approach is not used because the focus of this study is not 
directed at a particular user group. Moreover, prior research has shown that unweighted 
and weighted approaches produce the same results when there are a large number of 
items included [8]. In this study, a firm’s VDI is defined as the ratio of actual disclosures 
to the maximum possible score.  The VDI, calculated for each firm in each period, is as 
follows:   
  jtVDI =     actual disclosures for each firm 
   maximum possible disclosure score 
Where, 
jtVDI =  Voluntary Disclosure Index for firm j year t. This index will be calculated 
separately for each firm in each of the three periods. 
 
Independent variables 
The independent variables included in this study include the ownership concentration, 
and the identities of ownership structure, namely family; institutional and foreign. This 
study also includes the standard control variables of firm size, leverage and profitability 
in the statistical analysis. Data of independent and control variables are hand-collected 
from the two main sources which include the firms’ annual reports and the KLSE Annual 
Companies Handbook.  
 
Model development 
Two multiple regression models are constructed and performed. The first one is to 
investigate the explanatory power of the ownership concentration cross-sectionally for 
each time period while the second one is to examine different strands of ownership 
structure on the variability of voluntary disclosure. 
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where jtVDI  = firm’s voluntary disclosure index   
 β    = estimated coefficient for each item or category; 
jtOCON    = ownership concentration being percentage of ordinary shares held 
by top five shareholders; 
jtFAMILY  = family ownership being percentage of ordinary shares held by 
family; 
jtFOREIGN  = foreign ownership being percentage of ordinary shares held by 
foreigners; 
jtINST  = institutional ownership being percentage of ordinary shares held by 
institutional investors; 
 jtSIZE    = natural logarithm of total assets;  
jtLEV  = leverage being total liabilities divided by total assets; 
jtPROFIT  = profitability being net profit before tax divided by shareholders 
equity; 




Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the sample of Malaysian firms for the 
variables employed in this study. The minimum and maximum disclosure scores show 
that there is a wide range in the extent of voluntary disclosure. The mean voluntary 
disclosure scores show a steady increase from 23.97% in 1996 to 35.95% in 2006. The 
results indicate that the average level of voluntary disclosure is generally low although 
there is an increase in the extent of voluntary disclosure exhibited by Malaysian firms 
over the eleven-year time period (1996-2006).  
  
The breakdown of the voluntary disclosure information items is shown in Table 2. The 
mean scores registered an overall increase in the information disclosed for all the 
categories of voluntary disclosure. Sample firms tend to disclose more of corporate and 
strategic information, and directors and senior management information as reflected by 
higher disclosure scores in these two categories of information over the eleven-year time 
period. Social information tend to be least focused by the sample firms, registering the 
lower mean disclosure score.  
  
Table 1 also provides the information about the sample of Malaysian firms in terms of 
independent and control variables. Examination of result reveals that the ownership and 
control in terms of shareholdings by the top five shareholders remains highly 
concentrated. The top five shareholders held about 64% of total equity in the sample 
firms in 1996. Despite a slight decrease in the ownership concentration to 59% in 2001, 
the top five shareholders accounted for 61% of total equity in 2006. In terms of 
ownership composition, about 45% of the sample firms are held by family with the 
proportion of shareholdings in the range of 20%-22%. Shareholding by foreign investors 
is relatively lower with a mean foreign ownership decreased from 25% in 1996 to 16% in 
2001. Mean scores for institutional ownership are relatively stable in the range of 19% to 
23% between 1996 and 2006. 
 
TABLE 1: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR VARIABLES 
Variable 
Max Min Mean Median Standard deviation 
1996 2001 2006 1996 2001 2006 1996 2001 2006 1996 2001 2006 1996 2001 2006 
VDI 54.88 64.71 81.18 5.06 10.98 6.49 23.97 31.45 35.95 23.22 31.05 35.94 11.31 12.12 17.31 
TOP5 0.86 0.91 0.91 0.29 0.18 0.22 0.64 0.59 0.61 0.64 0.56 0.62 0.14 0.19 0.15 
FAM 0.74 0.71 0.75 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.21 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.25 0.26 
FOR 0.87 0.67 0.68 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.07 0.09 0.25 0.21 0.21 
INSTL 0.85 0.84 0.83 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.23 0.21 0.15 0.19 0.14 0.20 0.22 0.23 
SIZE  
(RM mil) 9,519 12,678 10,312 102 71 18 1,099 1,664 1,974 687 795 788 1,470 2,292 2,460 
LEV 0.86 0.96 1.15 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.39 0.37 0.38 0.40 0.34 0.37 0.19 0.22 0.25 
PROFIT 0.84 1.10 0.59 -4.14 -2.31 -0.99 0.08 -0.02 0.09 0.18 0.08 0.10 0.65 0.51 0.24 
 
TABLE 2: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR THE BREAKDOWN OF INFORMATION 
 
Corporate & strategic 
information Financial information 




information Social information 
 1996 2001 2006 1996 2001 2006 1996 2001 2006 1996 2001 2006 1996 2001 2006 
Minimum 8.33 12.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Maximum 73.08 80.77 84.62 77.78 83.33 84.21 1.00 1.00 1.00 54.55 60.00 72.73 47.83 56.52 82.61 
Mean 38.16 43.59 45.95 23.00 27.98 32.27 15.50 45.50 46.50 23.45 28.19 33.56 10.87 20.35 25.48 
Median 37.98 46.29 50.00 18.20 21.63 25.66 0.00 50.00 50.00 27.27 27.27 36.36 4.35 13.04 15.21 
Std Deviation 14.35 16.51 20.85 18.41 22.24 21.73 25.19 19.36 20.83 13.71 12.04 13.82 13.76 19.13 24.02 
Table 3 presents the correlation coefficients between variables, computed using Pearson’s 
product moment correlations. The analysis shows that voluntary disclosure is positively 
correlated with concentrated ownership structure in all years. Voluntary disclosure is positively 
correlated with family ownership in 1996 but is negatively correlated in later two years. While 
foreign ownership shows no correlation pattern with voluntary disclosure, institutional 
ownership is positively correlated with voluntary disclosure in all three years.  
 
TABLE 3: PEARSON CORRELATIONS ANALYSIS 
1996 VDI OCON FAMILY FOREIGN 
INSTITU-           
TIONAL 
FIRM 
SIZE DEBT PROFIT 
VDI             1996 
                   2001 
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**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
*   Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
 
The results for the multivariate test of the hypotheses developed above are documented in Tables 
4 & 5. The multiple regression models for all three years for Malaysian firms reported significant 
F value (at the 0.01 level) for the level of overall disclosure. The first multiple regression model 
which investigates the explanatory power of the ownership concentration cross-sectionally for 
each period gives adjusted R² of 26.2%, 38.7% and 48.0% respectively. The explanatory power 
of the second model which examines the ownership identities cross-sectionally for each period 
gives adjusted R² of 38.6%, 44.3% and 60.5% respectively.  The explanatory power of this 
model is comparable with prior studies [16, 20.61%], [27, 28.6%], [25, 31.4%], [23, 47.9%]. 
Multicollinearity statistical tests (variance inflation factor) are conducted and suggest that 
multicollinearity is not a concern in this study.  
 
As shown in Table 4, the coefficients for ownership concentration of the Malaysian firms are 
significant at 5% level in both 1996 and 2001. The ownership concentration becomes highly 
significant at the 1% level in 2006. But all these significance levels are not in the predicted 
direction. The findings indicate that the concentration ownership in top five shareholders 
discloses more voluntary disclosure in annual reports. The first multiple regression model does 
not support the prediction of a negative association between the ownership structure and the 
extent of voluntary disclosure. Thus, H1 is not supported by the findings. These findings 
contradict the prior studies conducted in Malaysia like [23], [27] and [19]. Nonetheless, the 
finding is consistent with [9].  The Malaysian regulatory bodies’ efforts in enhancing corporate 
governance seem to pay off. The results imply that the large firms with concentrated ownership 
in the hands of large shareholders appears to be a more important tool to mitigate agency 
problems when investors protection is weak by influencing greater disclosure in annual reports. 
It may reflect a firm’s choice of governance and disclosure practices. 
 
TABLE 4: REGRESSION RESULTS OF OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION 
  1996   2001   2006 
Adjusted R² 26.2    38.7    48.0   
F statistic 6.806    8.582    12.326   
Significance 0.001    0.000    0.000   
            
Variables Beta t Sig  Beta t Sig  Beta t Sig 
Constant  -2.605 0.012   0.110 0.913   -4.561 0.000 
OCON 0.315 2.535 0.015*  0.342 2.567 0.014*  0.297 2.710 0.009** 
Firm Size 0.366 2.947 0.005**  0.508 4.372 0.000**  0.589 5.676 0.000** 
Debt 0.228 1.767 0.184  -0.042 -0.308 0.759  -0.060 -0.506 0.615 
Profit 0.034 0.242 0.810   0.106 0.874 0.387   0.137 1.236 0.223 
**  Significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
*   Significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
 
Table 5 reports the regression result from model 2 in which voluntary disclosure index is 
regressed on family ownership, foreign ownership and institutional ownership. The results show 
that two types of ownership, foreign and institutional are significant predictors of the level of 
voluntary disclosure. The significant positive association between voluntary disclosure and 
foreign ownership is in line with expectations and supports the arguments that in order to obtain 
foreign funds, there is a greater need to disclose more information so as to monitor managerial 
actions. The result is consistent with [23] and [7] but inconsistent with [27]. Likewise, the 
institutional ownership variable has the predicted positive signs and is significant for all three 
year. This implies the concentrated shareholding by institutional investors has a strong influence 
on firms for greater voluntary disclosure. Thus, H3 and H4 are supported. Though family 
ownership has negative coefficients in each of the years under study but the variable is an 
insignificant predictor of the variability of voluntary disclosure practices of Malaysian listed 
firms. Thus, H2 is not supported. 
TABLE 5: REGRESSION RESULTS OF OWNERSHIP IDENTITIES 
  1996 2001 2006 
Adjusted R² 38.6   44.3   60.5   
F statistic 6.128   7.374   13.500   
Significance 0.000   0.000   0.000   
          
Variables Beta t Sig Beta t Sig Beta t Sig 
          
Constant  -0.711 0.481  3.289 0.002  -2.544 0.015 
FAMILY -0.245 -1.692 0.098 -0.129 -0.920 0.363 -0.079 -0.645 0.522 
FOREIGN 0.275 1.909 0.043* 0.248 1.935 0.030* 0.248 2.389 0.021** 
INSTITUTL 0.271 1.865 0.039* 0.245 1.696 0.027* 0.436 3.096 0.003** 
Firm size 0.257 2.015 0.050* 0.464 3.736 0.001** 0.380 3.246 0.002** 
Debt -0.284 -2.208 0.133 -0.197 -1.684 0.100 -0.148 -1.485 0.145 
Profit -0.068 -0.515 0.609 0.013 0.103 0.918 -0.021 -0.211 0.834 
**  Significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
*   Significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
 
For control variables in both models, firm size is significantly positively associated with the 
extent of voluntary disclosure. Larger firms possess the necessary resources for collecting and 
presenting an extensive array of information. This provides support for agency theory that 
voluntary disclosure systematically varies depending upon firm size. Leverage and profitability 
are not statistically significant in all years for both models. This could be due to the prevalent 
practice in Malaysia of including restrictive covenants in debt agreement. Contrary to signaling 
hypothesis [34], profitable firms do not disclose additional information to signal that the firm is 
being well-managed.  
 
Conclusion 
The paper has examined factors influencing the extent of voluntary disclosure in annual reports 
of firms listed on the Bursa Malaysia. This study extends previous studies on the determinants of 
corporate disclosure in two ways. First, it examines the impact of ownership structure and 
ownership identities – family ownership, foreign ownership and institutional ownership - on 
disclosure. Second, this longitudinal study covers an important timeframe where the change in 
factors that would influence firms’ disclosure practice is expected to take place. 
 
Controlling for firm size, leverage and profitability, the empirical results show that ownership 
concentration is positively associated with voluntary disclosure. The corporate reforms 
implemented by Malaysian regulatory bodies appear to have enhanced corporate governance 
structure and transparency. The positive association of high ownership concentration may reflect 
the firms’ choice to disclose more information as a governance initiative to enhance 
transparency.  
 
Institutional and foreign ownership have motivation to disclose in excess of mandatory 
requirements. The findings imply that the presence of institutional and foreign investors in a firm 
pushes firms to voluntarily disclose more information in annual reports. Such enhanced 
disclosure practice should be encouraged in order to attract funds from such investors both 
locally and abroad. Further, it is important that the management of Malaysian listed firms 
appreciate the importance of effective communication to the capital market especially its direct 
link to the reduction of cost of capital and subsequent increased firm value and wealth creation 
for the shareholders. 
 
The findings of the study have implication for disclosure policies and the governance initiatives 
in relation to ownership structure and composition, especially in the Asian-Pacific Basin region 
countries where the environments more prone to secrecy rather than transparency. Finally, 
caveats are in order. While the study only focuses on cross-sectional analysis, a time-series 
analysis of changes in ownership structure and pooled data analysis should also be considered. 
This study focuses on one avenue of corporate disclosure via corporate annual reports and the 
extent to which firms voluntarily release information through other means like the press release, 
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